

17 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with [] and Chuck Briggs, 16 April

1. Ray Cline has approved in principle the establishment of an all-source center in OCR. Indexed and locatable through this center will be COMINT, ELINT, NPIC, DD/P sensitive source material and other intel of a highly sensitive and limited clearance nature. There will be certain compartmentation within the center itself. The center will have to be physically located behind a barrier and access to it carefully controlled based on the actual clearances shown on an individual's building pass. This, of course, means a large job of determining need for access for individuals in each component plus the physical job by security of briefing and clearing such individuals and then marking the appropriate clearances on new badges.

2. Physically, the center will be built around Special Register as a nucleus, but some building remodeling will have to be done to accommodate it and it will probably be split between the first and second floors. [] feels that somehow or other greater access must be given to some of this material by analysts who, up to now, have never been permitted to know of the existence of large quantities of material having direct bearing on subjects on which they are working.

[] is confident that unwitting analysts are still writing requirements and asking unwitting collectors to obtain intelligence on subjects which are covered extensively through technical collection methods but the information thus obtained has not been made available to the analysts.

3. [] points out that developments in technical collection methods in recent years have tremendously increased the amount of valuable intelligence obtained. Further imminent break-throughs in the technical collection field hopefully will produce additional vast quantities of highly sensitive and important intelligence. It is therefore imperative that the most forward-looking methods possible shall be developed for the rapid processing, storage and retrieval of this information. In order to make proper use of the

information now available and to be obtained in the future, it seems essential that additional analysts will have to be cleared for access to information obtained from highly sensitive technical and human sources.

4. If an all-source center can be established, including a central requirements and collection guidance group which is capable of rapid and accurate retrieval of information, [] can foresee the day when analysts can do away with a large portion of their own files and rely on the center. He can foresee the time when analysts can be told to drop certain areas of study and attention because we know all that is necessary to know about the subject. Likewise, collectors can be told not to bother to collect information on certain subjects because technical coverage is more than adequate. Requirements and targets can thus be narrowed and refined, individuals' productivity can be directed toward specific "gap" areas rather than spread over broad, general, analytical studies. Although physical space and personnel staffing may present some problems, [] feels that space requirements may well be met by doing away with extensive personal files maintained by large numbers of analysts and that anticipated increased productivity of personnel should hold increases to a minimum.

5. In response to my question, [] said that Art Lundahl, Director of NPIC, had no objection to the indexing and storage of NPIC materials in the all-source center as long as it was done under the appropriate security safeguards.

6. I then asked [] if DIA knew of our plans for an all-source center or if he knew of any DIA plans for such a center. He stated that as far as he knew DIA was not aware of our plans, nor was he cognizant of any DIA plans along these lines. He added, however, that in view of Department of Defense intelligence, targeting and other defense responsibilities, he had no doubt that they might well establish such a center to meet their own requirements. I raised the question of the extensive duplication by DIA of CIA's production components as evidenced by the DIA Organization and Functions Manual, the manner in which DIA now rejects the great bulk of CIA's intelligence requirements on the basis of its DIRM and related issuances, and asked how he thought duplication by DIA of our all-source center might be avoided. [] did not feel it could be avoided until such time as CIA could furnish information to DIA on request as rapidly as DIA could obtain the information from its own files. On this point [] is hopeful that there will shortly be operational and available a facsimile system equipped with a secure scrambler device which would be enormously useful, though somewhat limited, in serving this purpose. The machine would for instance make it possible for the DCI to show a cable or document

on his desk simultaneously to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State in their own offices while the three of them discussed it on a secure telephone link.

7. Towards the close of our conversation, I commented that it seemed to me that the DCI, as leader of the intelligence community, would sooner or later have to actively involve himself in the rapidly growing extensive duplication of CIA production work toward which DIA seems heading. [] agreed but pointed out that Secretary McNamara and General Carroll are certainly going to take all steps they deem necessary to meet the intelligence requirements placed upon them by virtue of their military and defense responsibilities. He also observed that, notwithstanding the President's letter to the DCI establishing him as the community leader, he felt the DCI had recently weakened and watered down somewhat his position as community leader in submitting the Cuban report to the President's Board as his own rather than as a report from the entire intelligence community.

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I do not agree.

The President asked the DCE for the report. not the intelligence community. The community had



Inspector

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ample opportunity to express their views and did so but the final report had to be the Directors. In this case the DCE was not only acting as a leader but also a commander. If he had not chosen SECRET this course the report would never have been completed.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS		DATE	INITIALS	
1	[Redacted] 25X1		7/19	2M	
2	Mr. Earman			[Signature]	
3	[Redacted] 25X1			[Signature]	
4	File of Notes on OCR Survey				
5					
6					
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	
Remarks:					
<p>To 1+2 - I would appreciate having this back after you have noted.</p> <p>Also - please don't circulate this to anyone else without a brief check with me. Thanks -</p> <p>PS. I have a date with Art Fric Lundahl on Tuesday 23 April.</p> <p>F.</p>					
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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.				DATE	
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